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1 Introduction
In the decade since the onset of the nancial crisis, the disappointing recov-
ery has sparked renewed concern about the medium-run outlook for advanced
economies. Rather than returning to the pre-crisis trend, output has continued
to diverge from it. It is di¢ cult to know whether this is a cyclical phenomenon,
a slow recovery towards steady state, or a secular change in the nature of steady
state growth. As Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) emphasise, major nancial crises
can have long-lasting e¤ects, and this makes it di¢ cult to distinguish what is
cyclical from what is secular. As an indication of the di¢ culty of separating
low frequency signals from high frequency noise, the Great Moderation, the
marked reduction in the variance of the US macroeconomy after 1984, was not
recognised as a sustained change until the late 1990s.
This was also an issue after the Great Depression. Hansen (1939) writing a
decade after the Wall Street Crash, now sounds very topical with his concerns
about the e¤ects of demographic and technological change, the topics we will be
concerned with in this paper. Hansen warned of the danger of secular stagnation
driven by declining population growth, which would remove the incentive to
invest, though he did not anticipate the o¤setting e¤ects of the subsequent
war and the baby boom. He also criticised those who regarded the advance of
technology as a major cause of unemployment, arguing that there was a need
for an accceleration of the rate of progress in science and technology.
Echoing Hansen, after the last nancial crisis Summers (2015), in a speech
given in 2013, also warned of the dangers of secular stagnation. He noted
the long term decline in real interest rates, and raised the concern that the
equlibrium real rate may now have become negative and that a zero nominal
rate would then become a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economic activity
holding economies back below their potential.
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While there may be an important, but transitory, cyclical component in the
poor performance of the last decade, we will emphasise the secular forces likely
to shape medium run macro-economic developments. We rst review the impact
of demographic structure and innovation, then we draw of the empirical and the-
oretical work reported in Aksoy, Basso, Smith and Grasl (2015), ABSG, about
the impact of changes in demographic structure on macroeconomic outcomes.
This suggests that changes in age prole not only have signicant implications
for savings, investment, real interest rates and growth but also for innovation
and that the population aging predicted for the next decades will tend to reduce
output growth and real interest rates across OECD countries.
The age structure of the population can be measured quite precisely and
since it is largely predetermined by past fertility it can be forecast rather better
than many other economic variables. But for other variables there are impor-
tant measurement issues. Innovation is inherently di¢ cult to measure and the
process by which technological change transmits to productivity can be quite
opaque. There is the further concern that the mismeasurement of GDP and
productivity is causing us to misinterpret the secular trends. While some like
Feldstein (2017) have argued that the real growth in GDP and productivity
have been underestimated, the consensus seems to be that mismeasurement is
not enough to explain the lower productivity growth and that in the US the
break in trend pre-dates the crisis..
2 Demography, innovation and the macroecon-
omy
Hansens demographic concern was falling population growth rates, the current
concern is with an aging population. As is now well known, age proles in
OECD economies are signicantly changing. Figure 1 shows the average of
UN Population Division estimates of shares of each age group over 21 OECD
countries. In this sample, the average proportion of the population aged 60+
increased almost linearly from 16% in 1970 and is projected to reach 29% in
2030, with most of the corresponding decline experienced in the 0-19 age group.
Figure 2 shows the shares for the UK. The UN expects an inversion of the
population pyramidby 2030 with far reaching economic (and potentially social)
consequences. The baby-boom generation born between the end of World War
II and the late 1960s was very large, reecting high fertility. They started
to enter the labour force between the mid 60s and early 80s. Subsequently
fertility rates fell and hence the share of the youngest group (aged 0-9) of the
OECD societies fell from almost 20% in the 1970s, to almost 10% predicted for
2030.
While fertility declined, longevity increased in response to improved eco-
nomic conditions, widespread welfare systems and medical advances among
others factors. This increase in longevity and the increasing share of the aged
in society has implications for expenditure on health and social care, though
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responsibility for that expenditure di¤ers across countries. While there is an
overall aging trend across the OECD sample, there is substantial cross country
variation. Population aging in Japan is most pronounced followed by France,
the UK and the US. There is considerable cross sectional heterogeneity since
countries began aging at di¤erent times In addition to fertility and longevity
the other main inuence on the age prole is immigration or emigration; mi-
grants tend to be young. In addition the economic e¤ect of the age prole is
inuenced by participation rates, which di¤er substantially across countries de-
pending on the prevalence and length of higher education; the incentives and
disincentives for women to participate in the labour force; and the factors that
inuence retirement age and the employment of the old.
As in Hansens day there is concern both about the speed of technological
change and its employment consequences. There is the concern that driver-
less cars and computers that can defeat Go Champions threaten jobs. With
rapid improvements in computer power, it is feared that there will come a
point, labelled "The Singularity", where humans become economically super-
uous in the sense that they make no di¤erence to economic performance.
Echoing Hansens scepticism about the negative employment consequences of
technological change, Nordhaus (2015) argues that the key question is the sub-
stitutability between information and conventional inputs and there is little
evidence for a high degree of substitution.
While some fear accelerating technological change leading to the singularity
others fear declining rates of innovation and the repeal of Moores Law which has
driven the improvement of electronic components. Gordon (2015) argues that
technological change may have slowed and a decline in fundamental inventions
may reduce growth. As we noted above, measuring the rate of innovation is
inherently di¢ cult, and relating it to measured productivity growth even more
di¢ cult.
There is a well established link of innovation to demography. Kuznets (1960)
argued "It is the younger groups in the labour force who are most mobile -
in space and within the productive system- since unlike older workers they
are not committed to family and housing or to established positions. This
greater mobility is particularly true of new entrants into the labour force, who
naturally veer toward those sectors that are likely to spearhead the countrys
economic growth and who are oriented toward these sectors even in their training
within the educational system." Similarly, Jones (2010) presents microeconomic
evidence that there is a link between great ideas and the age of the genius. He
examines the distribution of Nobel-worthy ideas and great inventions and their
association with the age prole of their inventors. Irmen and Litina (2016) nd a
hump shaped e¤ect of aging on inventive activity. The increasing part captures
the recognition that aging requires inventive activity to guarantee current and
future standards of living. The decreasing part reects the tendency of aging
societies to lose dynamism and the willingness to take risks.
While most see population aging as having a negative e¤ect on growth,
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) argue that, in cross-section, countries where the
ratio of old to young workers has increased have grown faster, not slower, than
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other countries. They argue that this is because technology adjusts to o¤set
the negative e¤ects of aging, by the substitution of robots and other forms of
automation for the workers in short supply. The time-series e¤ects of aging
populations in countries like Japan do not seem so positive, but some have
argued that special factors are at work there.
The cause of the secular fall in the real interest rate over the last 35 years,
that Summers noted, is a matter of dispute, particularly when the share of prof-
its is tending to increase. Favero et al. (2016) relate the common persistent
component of the US term structure of interest rates to the age composition
of the population. One piece of the puzzle is how to interpret the e¤ect of the
demographic trends on real interest rates. This is not straightforward. On the
demand side, older people tend to dissave, putting upward pressure on the in-
terest rate; while younger people, expecting to live longer, save more, putting
downward pressure on interest rates. But on the supply side, the e¤ects are
reversed. The innovative tendencies of the young tend to raise the marginal
product of capital and the real interest rate. This e¤ect was observed with the
entry of the baby boom generation into the workforce. Correspondingly as the
population ages the adoption of new ideas slows and the marginal product of
capital declines. If the decline in the real interest rate was driven by demand
side e¤ects, one might expect this to cause investment to increase. But invest-
ment has not been increasing, consistent with the driving force being a supply
side e¤ect causing a fall in the marginal product of capital. If the supply side
channel dominates one would expect an ageing population to be associated with
declining innovation; a falling marginal product of capital and lower real interest
rates, lower investment and lower growth.
In a contrary view, Goodhart et al. (2015) argue that the historical com-
bination of the decline in real interest rates, the decline in real wages in the
advanced economies and rising inequality have been driven by positive labour
supply shocks and that the rising share of the old will cause savings to fall more
than investment, thus leading to a rise in real interest rates.
3 Estimates of Demographic e¤ects
In this section we summarise the empirical evidence, reported in ABSG, about
the impact of changes in demographic structure on macroeconomic outcomes.
As Kuznets (1960) pointed out, the aggregate population of a society serves as
producer, saver and consumer, but each age group contributes to the production,
saving and consumption processes di¤erently. Thus the demographic structure
may a¤ect the long and short-term macroeconomic conditions through several
channels. Di¤erent age groups (i) have di¤erent savings behaviour, according to
the life-cycle hypothesis; (ii) have di¤erent productivity levels, according to the
age prole of wages; (iii) work di¤erent amounts, the very young and very old
tend not to work, with implications for labour input; (iv) contribute di¤erently
to the innovation process, with young and middle age workers contributing the
most; and (v) provide di¤erent investment opportunities, as rms target their
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di¤erent needs. Thus, changes in demographic structure can be expected to
inuence savings and investment, hours worked, real interest rates, ination
and real output in the long and short-term either directly or via their e¤ects on
expectations on the future course of key variables.
ABSG estimate a panel vector autoregression, VAR, using data for 20 OECD
countries, over the period 1970-2007. The estimation period is deliberately
ended at 2007 so that the predictions of the demographic e¤ects are not conta-
minated with the e¤ects of the crisis; the large drop in output occuring at the
time the population is aging. This panel VAR is used to study how much of the
variation in key macroeconomic variables can be explained by the evolution of
the societys demographic structure, represented by the proportion of various
age groups in total population. The six endogenous macro-economic variables,
explained by the model, are the growth rate of the real GDP, gi;t; the share of
investment in GDP, Ii;t; the share of personal savings in GDP, Si;t; the loga-
rithm of hours worked per capita, Hi;t; the real short-term interest rate, Ri;t,
and the rate of ination, i;t: The exogenous variables, not explained by the
model, are population growth, the oil price and the age structure. Population
growth is included as a control to distinguish its e¤ects from the age structure
e¤ects that are partly caused by population growth.
Demographic variables, like the age structure change slowly and follow a
snake in the tunnelpattern as large cohorts, like the baby boomers, age. This
slow smooth pattern of demographic change makes it di¢ cult to separate its
e¤ects from other slow moving trends. However, as the demographic structure
of the countries in the sample changes at di¤erent times, the cross-section vari-
ability in the panel data can help to identify the e¤ect of these slow changes.
The dynamic nature of the panel vector autoregression, VAR, allows estimation
of the long-run e¤ects of the demographic movements, as they are transmitted
through the whole system. This allows for the interaction between the six macro
variables over time, while controlling for population growth and oil prices. The
long-run e¤ect is obtained by assessing how the impact of changes in the age
prole reverberate through the macroeconomy, as the six key variables interact.
Table 1 reports the long-term demographic e¤ects for three distinct age groups
(1: 0-19 year olds; 2: 20-59 and 3: 60+). ABSG also reports results using
a more granular demographic structure using eight age groups. The results are
qualitatively similar.
1 2 3
gt 0.040 0.103 -0.143*
It 0.068 0.091 -0.159
St 0.331* 0.226 -0.558*
Ht -0.703* 1.704* -1.001**
rrt -0.33** 0.627 -0.298
t 0.752* -0.87* 0.119
N o t e :  = 10%;  = 5% l e v e l s o f s i g n ic a n c e .
Table 1. Long-Run Demographic Impact. ** 10%, * 5% level of signcance.
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ABSG also estimate a system which includes the number of patent applica-
tions and conrm, at the macroeconomic level, the age pattern that Jones (2010)
identied at the microeconomic level. The demographic structure also a¤ects
innovation in a life-cycle pattern, with the proportion of prime-age workers (in
particular 40-49 age group) having a strong positive impact on total number of
patent applications. The proportion of young dependents and older generations
have a negative impact on the number of patent applications per capita.
Table 1 shows that the changing age prole across OECD countries has
economically and statistically signicant impacts on these key macroeconomic
variables and these e¤ects roughly reect a life-cycle pattern. A larger pro-
portion of the young reduces hours worked and increases ination. A larger
proportion of the working age increases growth, investment and savings, though
the e¤ects are not signicant, increases hours worked and reduces ination. A
larger proportion of the old reduces growth, investment savings and hours and
increases ination. These are broadly the e¤ects that one would expect, what
is particularly interersting is the demographic e¤ect on the real interest rate,
where the demand and supply e¤ects worked in opposite directions. On the de-
mand side older people tend to dissave, putting upward pressure on the interest
rate, while young workers expecting to live longer save more, putting downward
pressure on interest rates. While on the supply side, innovation by the young
workers raises the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate, while
the old inhibiting the adoption of new ideas depress the marginal product of
capital and the real interest rate. The estimates support a supply side inter-
pretation with the proportion of dependent young and the old depressing real
interest rates and the proportion of workers increasing them.
The estimates from the model with eight age groups are used to investigate
the impact of the baby-boomers entering the labour market in 1970s and ap-
proaching retirement in late 2000s for the individual countries in the sample.
For the in-sample period of 2000-2007 changes in the age prole contributed
to a signicant reduction in hours worked, with Japan being the country most
signicantly a¤ected. Using the United Nations population predictions an out-
of-sample exercise is performed to gauge how future demographic changes may
impact output growth and real rates until 2030. In most countries the decrease
in working-age population and fertility and the increase in the proportion of re-
tirees expected for the next 20 years would result in a strong decrease in trend
output growth and signicantly lower the real interest rate.
The United Nations (UN) population predictions and the long-run esti-
mates are used to perform country-specic prediction exercises. Since demo-
graphic trends are largely predetermined by past birth rates and slowly changing
longevity trends, one can predict age structure more precisely than many other
variables. Table 2 shows the contribution of demographic changes to output
growth for all countries in our sample. It compares the in sample period, the
last decade 2000-2009 with the current decade 2010-19 (based on population
predictions). For all countries in this sample the changes in age prole will lead
to a statistically and economically signicant drop in trend growth. The average
annual real output growth is expected to be reduced by 0.99 percentage points
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in Japan, 0.92 in the U.S., and 0.77 in Switzerland and 0.40 in the UK. The
table also gives the probability of an increase in the growth rate which is very
small.
2000-2009 2010-2019 Change Prob(Change>0)
Australia 1.64% 0.95% -0.69% 0.050
Austria 2.05% 1.37% -0.68% 0.038
Belgium 2.03% 1.28% -0.75% 0.056
Canada 1.57% 0.45% -1.12% 0.047
Denmark 1.20% 0.64% -0.57% 0.041
Finland 1.23% 0.18% -1.05% 0.051
France 1.57% 0.73% -0.83% 0.054
Germany 1.66% 0.76% -0.91% 0.048
Greece 1.50% 0.88% -0.63% 0.059
Iceland 2.56% 1.77% -0.80% 0.043
Ireland 3.59% 2.83% -0.76% 0.061
Italy 1.83% 1.23% -0.60% 0.053
Japan 0.92% -0.07% -0.99% 0.050
Luxembourg 1.98% 1.62% -0.37% 0.044
Netherlands 0.51% -0.55% -1.06% 0.046
New Zealand 2.64% 1.87% -0.78% 0.043
Norway 2.77% 2.16% -0.61% 0.042
Portugal 2.19% 1.38% -0.80% 0.043
Spain 1.42% 0.75% -0.67% 0.063
Sweden 0.44% 0.05% -0.39% 0.048
Switzerland 1.54% 0.77% -0.77% 0.042
United Kingdom 1.83% 1.43% -0.40% 0.044
United States 1.93% 1.00% -0.92% 0.051
Table 2. Average Predicted Impact on GDP Growth by Country
Similarly over the longer period from 2000 until 2030, using the UN demo-
graphic projections, the expected decrease in the proportion of the population
of working-age and the increase in the proportion of retirees cause both output
growth and the real interest rate to decline. For many countries the predicted
real interest rate is negative, supporting Summers concerns.
4 Demographics and Innovation, Production and
Medium-run Economic Performance
ABSG also develop a theoretical model to match the life cycle characteristics
observed empirically and to study the main mechanisms through which demo-
graphic changes a¤ect the macroeconomy. The key elements of the model can
be summarised as follows. The economic environment incorporates (i) life cycle
properties with three generations of the population (dependant young, workers
and retirees) and introduce investment in human capital and (ii) endogenous
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productivity and medium-term dynamics as in Comin and Gertler (2006) and
thus can study the long-term interaction of demographic changes with savings,
investment and innovation decisions. A change in the age prole a¤ects the
macroeconomy through three distinct channels. Firstly, changes in fertility and
availability of resources of workers a¤ect investment in human capital and the
labour supply. Secondly, aging a¤ects the saving decision of workers. Finally,
the share of young workers impacts the innovation process positively and, as
a result, a change in the demographic prole that skews the distribution of
the population to the right, leads to a decline in innovation activity. The link
between demographics and innovation is crucial in matching our empirical nd-
ings.
Using calibrated values of the parameters, model simulations show that an
increase in the share of young dependants and retirees decreases output growth
and investment while an increase in the share of working age does the opposite.
In addition, a permanent increase in longevity (an increase in life expectancy)
leads to increased growth rates in the short-term as the decrease in the marginal
propensity to consume of workers leads to lower real interest rate and an increase
in innovative activity. However, as the share of young workers decrease, produc-
tivity in innovation decreases leading to permanently lower output growth and
investment. Finally, the UN population predictions are fed into the theoretical
model and the expected changes in population dynamics, for di¤erent countries
in our samples, match the predictions of the empirical model.
Although the theoretical model only incorporates three age groups (relative
to the eight groups in the empirical model) it does well in capturing the esti-
mated impact of changes in demographic structure on output growth and real
interest rates for di¤erent countries. Increases in average age and reduced fertil-
ity are found to be a strong force reducing output growth and real rates across
OECD countries.
5 Conclusions
Even after a decade, it is inherently di¢ cult to distinguish cyclical but long-
lasting e¤ects of the crisis from secular changes to steady states. This is made
more di¢ cult if the steady state is removed by some statistical procedure like
the Hodrick-Prescott lter, Hamilton (2017). Nonetheless, our empirical and
theoretical results indicate that one secular trend, the aging of the population
in OECD countres, which is expected to continue in the next decades, may con-
tribute to reduced innovation, reduced output growth and reduced real interest
rates across OECD economies. In consequence, the next decades may witness a
shift in the focus of economic policy from short-run stabilisation, which has char-
acterised the 1990s and most of 2000s, to medium-run economic performance of
economies. We also believe that unless there are drastic changes most OECD
countries will need to devise new policies to foster medium-run economic growth
in an environment with aging population, perhaps by increasing investment in
human capital.
8
Of course, demographics are not destiny and our conclusions assume that
there will not be major changes in rates of immigration, labour force participa-
tion, fertility or longevity. In addition our argument depends on two interesting
linkages, that deserve further study: the demographic e¤ects on Innovation and
technological change and the demographic e¤ects on real interest rates.
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